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afflicted Canada to a greater extent than most other Western countries. As turnout in 
Canadian federal elections began to decline appreciably in the 1990s, inequality began to rise. 
With multilevel pooled analysis utilizing Canadian Election Studies (CES) from 1984 to 
2015, party manifesto data, and measures of inequality at the subnational level, this paper 
tests the effects of income inequality on turnout in Canada, and whether the relationship is 
conditioned by party policy programs. In line with relative power theory, mixed-effects 
regressions indicate that inequality is negatively associated with turnout, especially for low-
income earners. However, latent conflict is manifested when political parties propose greater 
redistribution, as the negative effects of inequality on turnout are then significantly alleviated.
 Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom 
(email: matt.polacko.2017@live.rhul.ac.uk).
Page 1 of 35
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/abs
American Behavioral Scientis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
1
1. Introduction
Voting has long been viewed as being interrelated with the performance and health of a 
democracy and thus a decline in voter turnout produces anxiety over the future of liberal 
democracy (Gidengil and Bastedo 2014: 6). While declining voter turnout has many 
correlates, such as declining youth participation and socioeconomic factors (LeDuc and 
Pammett 2014: 22), others have pointed to economic inequality (Mahler 2002; Lister 2007; 
Galbraith and Hale 2008; Anderson and Beramendi 2008; Jaime-Castillo 2009; Solt 2008, 
2010; Steinbrecher and Seeber 2011; Lancee and Van de Werfhorst 2012; Schäfer 2013; 
Filetti 2016; Jensen and Jespersen 2017). 
Mounting evidence also demonstrates that governments are far more responsive to the 
wealthy over everyone else (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Gilens 2012; Schakel 
2019; Bowman 2020). Thus, the nature of the relationship between income inequality and 
voting is important because widening income inequality can concentrate political and 
decision-making power in the hands of a few. Both the ‘relative power’ and ‘power resource’ 
theories posit that a greater concentration of wealth and, therefore, political power, leads to 
reduced turnout, especially for the lower classes (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). However, 
policies that focus on the lower classes can help mitigate inequality. Conflict theory predicts 
that by demanding greater redistribution through mass participation in elections, lower 
classes can potentially redress this power imbalance (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Indeed, as 
Mahler (2008) demonstrates, electoral turnout is positively related to redistribution in 
Western democracies. Yet, the evidence for conflict theory is sparse and the empirical utility 
of the accompanying median voter theorem has been questioned (Kenworthy and McCall 
2008).
A potential explanation for the lack of evidence in favour of conflict theory could be 
owing to the fixation that the inequality and turnout literature has had with the demands of 
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citizens, while neglecting the potential influence that the party aspect can have. As scholars 
have so far primarily concentrated on the ‘bottom up’ or demand side of the equation and 
neglected the ‘top down’ supply side. However, a growing consensus of academics now 
emphasize that party supply – in terms of the choices that parties present to the public – 
substantively matter for political participation (Evans and de Graaf 2013; Leighley and 
Nagler 2014; Heath 2015). In the context of rising inequality, how parties respond through 
their manifesto positions on redistribution, should then exert greater influence on whether 
people decide to participate in voting. Recent evidence also shows that voters do indeed listen 
to parties and understand their policy messages, especially on the issue of redistribution 
(Somer-Topcu et al. 2020). Therefore, this study builds on the previous literature by 
incorporating an unexplored mechanism potentially moderating the relationship – the 
programmatic policy choices on redistribution of political parties.
Moreover, although scholars have examined the relationship between inequality and 
turnout cross-nationally, and within the United States (US), none have focused on the 
relationship between inequality and turnout in Canada. Canada has experienced one of the 
most rapid and sustained increases in income inequality (OECD 2015) and one of the most 
dramatic declines in voter turnout across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (Gidengil et al. 2003: 107). Turnout in federal elections began to 
decline appreciably in the 1990s, precisely when income inequality began to substantially 
rise. For example, between 1993 and 2004, turnout plummeted 15 percent and remained at 
this new level for the following three elections (Elections Canada 2019). Whereas income 
inequality climbed 10 percent and has remained around this new level since (Heisz 2016). 
Only nine cross-national studies on the topic have contained Canadian elections in the 
estimations, with two-thirds finding a negative and significant effect overall (mirroring the 
results of the overall pool of studies). Canada features in four of the five aggregate-level 
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studies (Mahler 2002; Lister 2007; Stockemer and Scruggs 2012; Fumagalli and Narciso 
2012), ranging in inclusion between two and 12 elections, from 1965 to 2008. However, only 
five individual-level studies feature Canadian elections from international surveys, which are 
typically smaller than the Canadian Election Study (CES) (Anderson and Beramendi 2008; 
Solt 2008; Jaime-Castillo 2009; Persson 2010; Schäfer 2013). Each study includes between 
one and three of the federal elections held between 1993–2004, for a mere 9 cumulative 
elections. Furthermore, in the Canadian context, research has largely explored each 
phenomenon exclusive of one another and “no completely satisfactory answer for why 
turnout has declined in Canada has been reached” (Anderson and Stephenson 2010: 27). 
Thus, the income inequality and turnout relationship in Canada remains considerably 
unexplored, despite it being an ideal case study.
Therefore, this study seeks to address these gaps in the literature through a 
longitudinal multi-level pooled analysis utilizing CES surveys from 10 federal elections held 
between 1984 and 2015, as well as macro-level socio-economic and political data, to examine 
the effect of income inequality on voter turnout in Canada. 
The paper proceeds by reviewing the Canadian story and situating it within its 
international comparators. This is followed by a comprehensive review of the existing 
relevant literature, including the key hypotheses. The research design and modelling strategy 
are then outlined, followed by a test of the expectations against a unique dataset of 100 
province-year elections over three decades. Lastly, the paper will conclude with a discussion 
of the key limitations, implications, and avenues for future enquiry.
2. Situating Canada
Income Inequality
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Income inequality has risen both in countries that have traditionally had high levels of 
inequality such as the US, but also in countries where it has traditionally been low, such as 
Denmark and Sweden. The Gini coefficient is the most popular indicator for measuring 
income inequality in a population and ranges between 0 and 1 (Osberg 2018: 9). The strength 
of the Gini is that it responds to all changes in the distribution of income but it tends to be 
more responsive to changes in the middle of the distribution, which can understate tail-end 
changes in inequality at the very top or bottom (Heisz 2016: 78-79). The average Gini 
coefficient for OECD countries stood at 0.29 during the mid-1980s but has since increased by 
roughly 10 percent (Sran et al. 2014: 22). 
Canada ranks above the OECD average in both its current inequality levels and the 
degree of the increase since the 1980s (OECD 2015; Heisz 2016). Prior to the Second World 
War, income inequality roughly matched current levels in Canada, then steadily declined 
until the late 1980s. Subsequently, between 1988 and 2004, in what has been dubbed the 
“Great U-Turn” (Yalnizyan 2010: 4), Canada’s Gini coefficient rose dramatically from 0.282 
to 0.322. It then fell after the financial crisis down to 0.312 in 2011 but has since continued 
its upward trajectory (Statistics Canada). As Figure 1 shows, the steepest rise in the Gini rate1 
occurred in the mid-1990s, which coincides precisely when the largest decline in federal 
turnout occurred. Inequality rose dramatically in the 1990s, largely due to Canadian 
governments shifting to the right by substantially reducing redistribution in its tax and 
transfer system, which had previously kept pace with rising market inequality (Banting and 
Myles 2013; Heisz and Murphy 2016).
1 The Gini index is employed going forward to aid in interpretive purposes, which is the Gini coefficient 
multiplied by 100.
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Figure 1: Turnout by Gini Index, Canada, 1984–2015
Sources: Elections Canada, Voter Turnout at Federal Elections and Referendums; Statistics Canada, Table: 
11-10-0134-01 (formerly CANSIM 206-0033)
Examining inequality across provinces and time has many advantages.2 Canadian 
provinces possess considerable comparable autonomy in administering social policy and 
research shows that inequality shifts are predominantly owing to provincial rather than 
federal transfers (Boychuk 2013). Inequality has risen across every Canadian province and 
region since 1988, although each province has experienced their own trajectory (Yalnizyan, 
2014: 53–54). Canada’s richest provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario), along 
2 Firstly, it substantially increases the number of cases. Secondly, there is 2.3 times more variation in provincial-
levels of income inequality in Canada, as compared to national-levels for the period analyzed. Ranging from 
24.0 (Prince Edward Island in 1993) to 33.2 (Ontario in 2004). Likewise, there is 2.32 times more variation in 
turnout at the provincial level, ranging from 47.7 (Newfoundland in 2008) to 85.9 percentage points (Prince 
Edward Island in 1988). Thirdly, provincial measures of inequality allow for an exploration both within and 
across regions and provinces, which is especially apt in a highly regionalized country such as Canada. Fourthly, 
data at the provincial level provides “a much more finely discriminated measure of both turnout and inequality 
than do national-level figures, which often represent averages of very diverse regions” (Mahler 2002: 130). 
Fifthly, research has found that local economic conditions strongly influence evaluations of the health of the 
national economy. As citizens use their more direct local conditions as a source for judgments in order to 
compensate for a lack of numeracy regarding macroeconomic conditions (Newman et al. 2015; Hansford and 
Gomez 2015; Newman and Hayes 2019), including in the Canadian context (Cutler 2002).
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with Newfoundland, have witnessed the largest rises, while New Brunswick, Quebec, and 
Saskatchewan the smallest increases. Saskatchewan was able to avoid the sizeable rises that 
occurred throughout the rest of the country in the 1990s, likely owing to the domination of its 
government by the leftist New Democratic Party (NDP) during the 1990s (Sealey and 
Andersen 2015: 55). While, Newfoundland has differed from its Maritime neighbours in 
witnessing a pronounced rise in recent years following an offshore oil boom (Fortin and 
Lemieux 2016: 234–236).
Voter Turnout
Across the West, voter turnout has declined steadily from an average of 82 percent in the 
1970s to 72 percent (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 11). The trend is nearly universal and the 
decline in turnout is particularly acute in Switzerland, and three Anglo-Saxon countries 
(United Kingdom, US, and Canada). Post-war turnout at national elections averaged around 
75 percent in Canada until 1988. Since then it has declined dramatically and averaged in the 
low-60s in the five elections between 2000 and 2011 (See Figure 1 above). The one exception 
being the 2015 election, which saw a substantial rise to 68.3 percent. However, it remains to 
be seen if this number is sustainable long-term, as it was an unusually competitive election, 
with essentially a three-way dead heat in polling up until the final few weeks of the 
campaign. There was also a deep desire for change, and much of the increase was owing to 
unprecedented youth turnout, despite continued underlying apathy and low political 
knowledge amongst the youth (Urban 2016). Although the turnout rates since 2000 have been 
roughly 10 percentage points higher than American presidential elections, they are still 
around 10 percentage points lower than the median average turnout for OECD members 
(Blais and Rubenson 2013).
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The leading explanations as to why Canada’s turnout is comparatively low, stem from 
its political system and demographics. As turnout tends to be lower by 3 percentage points in 
majoritarian systems, and tends to be lower in federal systems, as well as large, sparsely 
populated countries (Gidengil et al. 2004: 104). Consensus is lacking in explanations for 
Canada’s marked turnout decline, which is particularly acute amongst the young. The leading 
explanations rely on period cohort effects in recent generations having lower political 
interest, knowledge, and civic duty (Blais et al. 2004), and a decline in the competitiveness of 
elections (Johnston et al. 2007).
Canada is also an anomaly in having higher turnout in subnational elections (Studlar 
2001). This is in part owing to Canada’s pronounced regionalism and diversity. As according 
to Fearon’s diversity index, it is the most ethnically and culturally diverse Western country 
(Fearon 2003: 215–216). Exemplifying this regional diversity, Canada’s two Atlantic island 
provinces have long stood out on turnout. Prince Edward Island has since Confederation had 
the highest turnout, due to its extremely small constituency sizes and high interest in politics, 
while Newfoundland stands out as long having had the lowest turnout, due to it being a 
latecomer in joining Canada (1949), lower education levels, and general disengagement 
towards federal affairs (Blake 2005: 6–7). The island provinces have maintained their leading 
positions at opposite ends of the spectrum, having experienced largely uniform declines in 
turnout. Moreover, Alberta has voted the second least in all but three of the 10 elections, 
while the remaining provinces tend to not substantially differ from one another each election.
3. Previous Literature
Although most of the West has witnessed declining turnout and rising inequality the past few 
decades, only in recent years have scholars focused on the relationship between the two. They 
have so far only examined the relationship between income inequality and turnout cross-
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nationally, and within the US. Country-case studies have also only been undertaken twice – a 
decade ago – involving American presidential (Galbraith and Hale 2008), and gubernatorial 
(Solt 2010) elections. Within this literature, inequality has been found to exert either a 
negative or null relationship on turnout, with scant evidence of a positive relationship. 
Academics have also developed three principal theories attempting to explain the effects of 
inequality on turnout: ‘relative power,’ ‘conflict,’ and ‘resource’ theory. Therefore, this study 
formulates three separate hypotheses, one for each theory.
Relative Power Theory
Relative power theory predicts that income inequality has a negative effect on turnout and 
that the turnout of all income groups is expected to decline. This occurs due to inequality 
generating a greater concentration of wealth into the hands of high-income individuals, who 
then translate that increased wealth into more political power, as policymakers respond to 
their interests over the poor (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). Consequently, low-income earners 
become disengaged from the political process as they “conclude that politics is simply not a 
game a worth playing” (Solt 2008: 57). Eventually the turnout of high-income individuals 
also declines (although not to the same extent), as less engagement is then required to 
maintain their dominant position in the political process (Steinbrecher and Seeber 2011).
H1: Increased income inequality leads to reduced voter turnout amongst all income 
groups.
Solt finds evidence in support of relative power theory both cross-nationally (2008) 
and at the US state level (2010). He has produced the most pronounced results, whereby 
political participation is lower in countries with above average income inequality, particularly 
among those on low incomes. Similarly, Galbraith and Hale (2008) find that higher US state-
level income inequality leads to lower turnout in presidential elections in their study covering 
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1980–2004. Beyond the US context, Seeber and Steinbrecher (2011) find in a round four 
European Social Survey (ESS) sample of 27 countries, that income inequality lowers turnout 
at the individual level but also reduces the income gap in turnout.
Conflict Theory
In contrast to relative power theory, conflict theory predicts the opposite effect on turnout. It 
builds on Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) median voter model, by predicting that higher income 
inequality will lead to a more conflictive politics because increasing income inequality 
stimulates more engagement in the political process for all income groups. This occurs 
because low-income individuals will start to push for more redistribution, due to being made 
worse off from increased inequality. This in turn becomes costlier for the rich, who then 
become more politically engaged so that they can counter the adoption of redistributive 
policies (Stockemer and Parent 2014).
Evidence for conflict theory is sparse, although Leighley and Nagler (2014) find 
some support in their case study of US presidential elections from 1972–2008. They find 
that people who perceive greater policy differences are more likely to vote and that the 
poor are less likely to perceive policy differences than the wealthy. However, even though 
people largely underestimate the true extent of income inequality, often by substantial 
amounts (Hauser and Norton 2017), polling indicates that the public is still very concerned 
about rising inequality in Canada. A 2014 EKOS Research poll, found that 74 percent of 
Canadians believed “the middle class is shrinking and falling backward,” and a similar 
2014 Pollara poll revealed that 85 percent “believe income inequality is no longer about 
the gap between the rich and the poor, but rather the very rich and everyone else” (Osberg 
2018: 43–44). Moreover, two-thirds of Canadians feel that the gap between the rich and 
poor is widening (Adams 2017) and an equal number believe the rich should be taxed 
more to support the poor (OECD 2019). Despite heightened public concern about 
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inequality it continues to rise in Canada, and governments have responded with less 
redistribution (Banting and Myles 2013). Therefore, the second hypothesis tests whether 
turnout decline could be stemming from a lack of effective policy offerings on 
redistribution, as voters can only respond to the policy choices presented to them:
H2: When political parties propose greater redistribution, overall turnout increases 
during periods of high inequality.
Power Resource Theory
Power resource theory posits that an individual’s participation in the political process 
depends on the amount of resources available to them (Verba et al. 1995). Greater income 
inequality typically results in less resources for lower-class citizens and more for upper-class 
citizens. Thus, the greater the amount of income inequality in a society, the less politically 
active the poor become, as opposed to the wealthy, who increase their political engagement. 
More equal societies should also have a more equal system for provisioning services to all 
members of society and make it easier for the lower classes to participate in civic life (Lancee 
and Van de Werfhorst 2012: 1168). It is possible that overall turnout can still rise with 
increased inequality because if all income groups are getting richer in absolute terms, then 
they will still have more resources available to participate in politics, despite the fact that the 
poorest are getting poorer in relative terms (Jaime-Castillo 2009: 6). However, the theory 
generally predicts that greater inequality is positively related for high-income earners and 
negatively related for low-income earners (Solt 2008). This tends to lead to overall declining 
turnout, as well as greater turnout inequality.
H3: Increased income inequality leads to reduced voter turnout amongst low-income 
individuals, and increased turnout amongst high-income individuals.
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Cross-national support for power resource theory can be found in multiple studies. 
Anderson and Beramendi (2008) find in a World Values Study (WVS) from 1999–2001, that 
inequality suppresses turnout across national contexts because individuals living in more 
unequal countries are less likely to vote, with a consistent linear pattern for all income 
groups. Using data from the 2006 wave of the ESS, Lancee and Van de Werfhorst (2012: 
1176) demonstrate that “inequality seems to isolate low-income individuals from civic and 
social life,” while simultaneously promoting “the social integration of the rich.” Schäfer 
(2013: 185) finds similar results in an expanded 1970–2008 study of 23 OECD countries, 
whereby predicted turnout is 18 percentage points lower when moving from the most to least 
equal country.
Canadian Contribution
In the Canadian context, income is known to exhibit a limited effect on voting (Alford 1963; 
Johnston 2017: 39–41). Although income inequality and turnout are yet to be examined, the 
relationship between inequality and related political attitudes do, however, appear in two 
recent studies relying on the CES. Perrella et al. (2016) investigate the effect of a growing 
income gap on six political attitudes ranging from satisfaction with democracy, to external 
political efficacy from 1993–2011. They do not examine participation and they find that 
income disparities have little effect beyond reduced support for political institutions. 
However, they make a strong case that the CES produces conservative findings, because most 
of the attitudinal questions appear in the mail-back portion of the CES, whose respondents 
tend to be “older, more educated, and wealthier,” as well as “less cynical” (Perrella et al. 
2016: 45). Similarly, Sealey and Andersen (2015) look at the relationship between inequality 
and redistribution from 1993–2008 and find that higher inequality leads to greater support for 
redistribution. Although baseline support is contingent on provincial context, as provincial 
political cultures moderate the relationship.
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Furthermore, The Samara Centre for Democracy encapsulates aspects of all three 
hypotheses in a recent report on the views of the politically disengaged in Canada. Members 
of a low-income focus group that rarely votes, outlined “growing inequality” as one of the 
prime reasons for not participating politically (H1) (Samara 2012). They also “viewed 
themselves as passive observers of politics –  not by choice,” but because of a “lack of time 
or energy” owing to more pressing concerns in their lives (H3), as well as a pervasive feeling 
of powerlessness at being unable to influence an unresponsive political system (H2) (Bastedo 
et al. 2011: 10–11).
Altogether, it appears that there is not yet a conclusive answer to the effect of income 
inequality on turnout and the p ecise mechanisms warrant further exploration. Consequently, 
this study builds on the previous literature by incorporating a different mechanism – the 
redistributional policy offerings of political parties. As voters could be abstaining due to the 
lack of effective representation in the policy realm. Additionally, this paper provides the first 
country-case study outside of the US to explore the effect of income inequality on turnout, 
and covers the longest duration (31 years) within a single country yet.
4. Data and Methodology
Methodology
Analysis is undertaken via a uniquely created dataset comprising individual-level and macro-
level data. The individual-level data derive from the 10 most recent waves of the Canadian 
Election Study (CES), which is merged with subnational level data from Statistics Canada, as 
well as national-level data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), and Elections 
Canada. The CES offers the most extensive surveys on public opinion and voting for 
Canadian elections and contains information on respondents from all 10 provinces for each 
federal election since 1965. The 10 federal elections included span over 30 years from 1984–
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2015, with each survey containing roughly 3,500 to 4,500 respondents, yielding a total 
analytical sample of 39,560.
The dataset contains individuals nested within elections over time, therefore, 
multilevel models are applied to pooled cross-sectional data. As the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, logistic mixed-effects models are estimated, which include both fixed and 
random effects. Since the higher-level units are too small to cluster by province or election 
(10 each) without introducing bias into the estimates, observations are clustered by province-
year, providing 100 in total (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). Thus, all models account for the 
clustering of individuals within the province-year electoral contexts through the specification 
of a random intercept and assume that the effect for all individual and contextual variables is 
fixed across each election.
Individual-level Variables
The individual-level variables are all drawn from the CES. The dependent variable is turnout, 
which is a dichotomous measure of the straightforward question as to whether a respondent 
voted in the recent federal election.
A key independent variable utilized is income, which measures the total household 
income of each respondent, divided into five quintiles (lowest to highest). Quintiles were 
chosen because they have been the most commonly used form of measuring individual 
income in the literature, “since an individual's ranking in the income distribution is more 
comparable over time than is the individual's absolute income level” (Leighley and Nagler 
1992: 727). A prominent problem with surveys of household income is non-response, but 
within the CES response rates were nearly as high as most other socio-demographic 
variables, as respondents were normally provided the option of providing their total 
household income or identifying their placement within 10 categories. Nevertheless, a 
Page 14 of 35
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/abs
American Behavioral Scientis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
14
robustness check is still performed on the missing income values to ensure that the dataset 
does not contain any bias (see Supplemental Information S5).
The most relevant individual-level controls to turnout are included. Young people 
tend to vote in low numbers and the likelihood of voting increases substantially as one gets 
older until around age 55, when it then begins to level off (Blais 2000: 49–50). This 
curvilinear relationship has been found to be especially pronounced in Canada (Blais and 
Rubenson 2013: 98). Therefore, age and age squared (age2) variables are included. Voting is 
also positively related to education, marriage, nativity, and religious and union status (Smets 
and van Ham 2013). Therefore, religion, union, married, and native dummy variables are 
included, and education is added as a categorical variable. Gender is also controlled for via a 
female dummy variable. Lastly, a respondent’s political interest is included, to control for the 
notion that greater political interest predisposes one to vote. The variable is measured based 
on responses to the question: “how interested in politics are you generally?” via a 3-point 
(low to high) scale. 
Socio-economic Variables
Income inequality is measured at the provincial level. The adjusted after-tax Gini coefficient 
is employed rather than the market income Gini coefficient because the main mechanisms 
leading inequality to affect turnout are most likely to operate via a person’s disposable 
income after taxes and transfers, rather than their market income (Stockemer and Scruggs 
2012: 767). Voters are typically backward looking with a memory of roughly one year when 
evaluating the performance of government and the impact of the economy (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2013). To account for this one-year memory of retrospective voting, I lag the Gini 
indicator for one year. Gini’s are obtained from Statistics Canada’s Table 11-10-0134-01.
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Further socio-economic variables measured at the provincial level are added as 
controls. Union density has declined a full 10 percentage points from its peak of 41.8 percent 
in 1984 (Sran et al. 2014: 25–26), which could also be negatively impacting turnout. 
Population size has been negatively associated with turnout, as smaller populations increase 
the likelihood that people know the candidates in their region (Cancela and Geys 2016). 
Population differs markedly among Canada’s provinces, ranging from 146,000 (Prince 
Edward Island) to 13.8 million (Ontario). Thus, a logged measure of provincial population is 
added. To rule out spurious correlation, average logged income per capita, measured at 
current CAD dollars, is added, and lagged one year. In addition, the average advanced degree 
attainment for each province is added. Data for all four variables derive from Statistics 
Canada. Lastly, average level of church attendance is calculated from the General Social 
Survey (GSS). As each survey includes a very sizable sample of respondents providing how 
often they attend religious services, on a 5-point (low to high) scale.
Political Variables
A key aggregate-level independent variable examines the policy space of the political parties 
in Canada. Following previous research, party issue positions are estimated utilizing party 
manifesto data, drawn from the CMP (Ezrow and Xenokasis 2011).3 The CMP is a popular 
dataset for the study of political parties and offers reliable estimates that correlate highly with 
national experts and mass surveys, including 104 Canadian party experts surveyed by Benoit 
and Laver (2006) (see also Cochrane 2010). The policy statements are classified into 56 
policy categories over seven domains and this study focuses on the items that relate most 
closely to matters of redistribution. The left–right redistributional scores of the various parties 
have been calculated by summing up the percentages of all the sentences in the left category 
3 Manifesto Project Dataset Version 2018b (Volkens et al. 2018).
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and subtracting their total from the sum of the percentages of the sentences in the right 
category (Laver et al. 2003).4 In order to examine the extent of redistribution offered by the 
parties for each election, a left-right party position variable is constructed (rescaled 1–10 
from left–right).5 The variable is calculated based on the mean weighted by party vote share 
policy position on redistribution for each election.6
I also control for national-level political factors that may influence turnout in Canada. 
Uncompetitive elections tend to reduce incentives to vote, which has been particularly acute 
in Canada, and has been partially attributed with the sudden decline in turnout in the 1990s 
(Johnston et al. 2007). Thus, party competition for each federal election is measured, which is 
the difference in total votes between the first- and second-place parties. The effective number 
of parties (ENP) is also controlled for, and across most studies is negatively associated with 
turnout (Cancela and Geys 2016), even though theory might predict a positive association 
(Blais 2006).7 Data for both variables derive from the CMP. The incumbent government is 
controlled for, which can influence who turns out to vote (Iversen and Soskice 2006). As only 
two parties (Liberals and Conservatives) have formed the government in Canada, incumbent 
party is measured via a dummy variable (0 = “Conservative”; 1 = “Liberal”). Henderson and 
McEwen (2010; 2015) have shown that distinctive regional identities (including Québécois) 
can lead to greater turnout for those regions in subnational elections, when cultivated via 
regional parties. To test this at the federal level, a regional party dummy variable is included 
and coded as 1 for any province-year election whereby a regional party achieved over 20 
percent vote share in a province, and multiple seats in parliament (Henderson and McEwen 
4 Policy position on redistribution = (per401 + per402 + per407 + per414 + per505) - (per403 + per404 + per405 
+ per406 + per409 + per412 + per413 + per415 + per416 + per504) from the CMP dataset.
5 To aid in interpretation, CMP redistributional party scores are rescaled from a left to right (-100 to 100) to (1–
10) scale, using the following equation: (CMP score x 9/200) + 5.5 (Ezrow and Xenokasis 2011).
6 For example, the rescaled (1-10) economic policy positions of the main parties in the 2011 election is centrist 
at 5.01, as the three main parties from left–right are: New Democrats = 4.47; Liberals = 4.84; Conservatives = 
5.56, with the two remaining parties (the Greens and Bloc Québécois), scoring 4.51 and 5.16 respectively.
7 ENP is calculated by first squaring the vote share of each party individually, then adding the sum of the 
individual parties together, and finally dividing 1 by the new total sum.
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2010: 412).8 Lastly, greater election frequency has been negatively related to turnout, 
especially in federal systems (Studlar 2001). Thus, the time in months since the last election 
(provincial or federal) for each province-year election is calculated. These three variables 
derive from Elections Canada. 
5. Results
Descriptive Analysis
Firstly, the trends in turnout are investigated. The turnout rate is 87.6 percent, which is 
substantially larger than the actual turnout rates by a comparatively large (country-wise) 21.7 
percentage points. Likelihood to vote increases with each income quintile and the richest 
quintile votes around 11.2 percentage points more than the bottom quintile in the sample. 
However, more than half of this increase occurs between the first and second quintiles. To 
further investigate the income gap in turnout, a ratio calculation of the turnout rate among the 
top quintile, versus the bottom quintile is performed. The mean ratio is 1.15, meaning that the 
top quintile voted 1.15 times more than the bottom quintile.
The turnout rate also incurs little provincial variation, as 9 of the provinces reside 
within 4 percentage points of the average turnout rate – with Newfoundland the expected 
outlier at 80 percent. Despite the very small variance in turnout, we do see a weak correlation 
between provincial levels of turnout and income inequality. Figure 2 below displays the 
cross-provincial average turnout plotted by average Gini index. As expected, there is a 
negative correlation, as provinces with higher turnout tend to have lower levels of inequality. 
We can see that turnout is nearly 3 percentage points lower in provinces with the highest 
8 The only two substantial regional parties that emerged in Canada over this period are the Bloc Québécois and 
the Reform Party, which was a right-wing protest party centered on Western Canadian disaffection. Both parties 
achieved official opposition status in the 1990s and achieve a score of 1 in Quebec (for 7 elections), and in the 
four Western provinces for both elections in the 1990s.
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income inequality, in comparison to provinces with the least, which is in line with relative 
power theory.
Figure 2: Provincial Turnout by Gini Index
Cross-provincial average turnout plotted against the average Gini Index.
When the time trends are determined, turnout increases in the sample, which is at 
odds with the general increase in income inequality, and the income gap in turnout also 
decreases.
Estimation Results
To test the main hypotheses, I specify a mixed-effects logistic regression. Table 1 presents 
the results from three different models. Model 1 provides a baseline estimate and includes 
each of the individual and contextual variables. The individual-level variables largely 
perform as expected and are all significant. Those on high incomes are significantly 
(p<0.001) more likely to vote than those on low incomes (b=0.163).
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Table 1: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Individual Variables
Age 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Female 0.123** 0.123** 0.121**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Married 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.319***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Income 0.163*** 0.112 0.162***
(0.018) (0.294) (0.018)
Native 0.341*** 0.341*** 0.341***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Union 0.121** 0.121** 0.121**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Religion 0.144** 0.144** 0.145**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Political Interest 0.770*** 0.770*** 0.771***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Contextual Variables
Gini t-1 -0.065** -0.070 0.691*
(0.024) (0.037) (0.296)
Union Density -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Income Per Cap t-1 (log) -0.668** -0.667** -0.670**
(0.255) (0.255) (0.245)
Population (log) 0.027 0.027 0.017
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
Church Attendance -0.200 -0.201 -0.214
(0.164) (0.164) (0.156)
Degree -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Last Election (months) 0.006* 0.006* 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Incumbent Party -0.246** -0.245** -0.253***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.071)
Regional Party 0.010 0.010 0.072
(0.104) (0.104) (0.102)
Party Competition -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
ENP -0.179 -0.180 -0.243
(0.132) (0.132) (0.131)
Left-Right Position -0.098 -0.098 4.286*
(0.229) (0.229) (1.730)
Gini t-1 # Income -0.002
(0.010)
Gini t-1 # Left-Right Position -0.148**
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(0.058)
Constant 7.642* 7.774* -14.358
(3.119) (3.212) (9.176)
Variance -1.775*** -1.776*** -1.921***
(0.209) (0.209) (0.257)
Log Likelihood -7842.1309 -7842.1161 -7839.052
AIC 15732.26 15734.23 15728.1
BIC 15926.14 15936.19 15930.06
Province Year 100 100 100
N 23,818 23,818 23,818
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Most of the contextual controls are not significant. When the Liberals are in power 
people are significantly less likely to vote, which could in part be owing to the Liberals 
centrism and role as Canada’s natural governing party. As Johnston (2017: 88–89) has 
shown, turnout is negatively related to Liberal vote share, who tend to benefit from times 
with high indifference, and stand to lose vote share in times of insurgency when turnout 
increases. When provincial average income is higher, people are also significantly less likely 
to vote. People are more likely to vote when elections are less frequent and when there are 
less parties, which likely is owing to the much higher turnout in the 1980s, when there were 
only three parties. Some evidence appears that people are more likely to vote when political 
parties offer more redistribution, although left-right party position is not significant. 
Most importantly, Model 1 indicates that inequality does significantly depress turnout 
at (p<0.01). Figure 3 below displays the predicted probabilities of turnout at different levels 
of income inequality. We can see that the likelihood to vote is substantially lower at higher 
levels of inequality. At the lowest levels of inequality people are much more likely to vote 
(roughly 90 percent) but at the highest level of inequality, significantly less so (roughly 85 
percent). Thus, support is found for relative power theory and Hypothesis 1.
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Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Turnout by Income Inequality with 95% C.I. (Model 1)
Model 1 reveals a sizeable income gap in turnout that is often larger in countries with 
lower turnout such as Canada. Mahler (2008: 176) reports that the income gap in turnout for 
the 1997 federal election was 17.6 percentage points in the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES), which is 6.4 percentage points larger than in the CES. Turnout is also 8 
percentage points larger in the CES, which provides much less scope for a large turnout 
income gap. It is likely then that the CES considerably underestimates turnout inequality.
To test for power resource theory (Hypothesis 3) – that the income gap in turnout is 
greater when inequality is higher – Model 2 specifies an interaction between gini t-1 and 
income. The interaction is not significant, and we do not see evidence that provincial 
inequality differentially affects income groups. The lack of a significant effect could be 
owing in part to survey underestimation of turnout inequality or perhaps to the comparatively 
persistent absence of class voting in Canada (Alford 1963; Johnston 2017: 39–41).
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Model 3 tests the second hypothesis – that greater policy redistribution increases 
overall turnout during periods of high inequality – via an interaction between gini t-1 and left-
right party position. The interaction is negative and significant at (p<0.01). Figure 4 below 
displays the average marginal effects of inequality by the redistributional party system 
position (left–right) on turnout. It shows that the effect of inequality is slightly above zero 
when political parties are very left-wing on redistribution, but that turnout gradually dampens 
the more right-wing the parties become. When party systems move from the most leftward to 
the most rightward position, a one standard deviation increase in inequality exhibits roughly a 
1.7 percentage point decrease in turnout. The interaction provides some support for 
Hypothesis 2. As the negative effects of inequality on turnout are exacerbated when parties 
offer less redistribution and are mitigated when the party system offers greater redistribution.
Figure 4: Average Marginal Effects of Inequality by Party System Redistribution on Turnout 
with 95% C.I. (Model 3)
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When we investigate the interaction further by breaking Model 3 down by income 
groups, we can see more precisely how conflict theory is dependent on the offer of greater 
redistribution. Table 2 presents the results from the interaction for the bottom two quintiles 
versus the rest of the population. We can see that the interaction is only significant for the 
bottom two quintiles (p<0.01) and that the negative effect is nearly twice as strong for the 
bottom two quintiles. 
Table 2: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote for Bottom Two vs 
Top Three Income Quintiles
Model 3a Model 3b
Quintiles 1-2 Quintiles 3-5
Individual Variables
Age 0.069*** 0.053***
(0.010) (0.012)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.168*** 0.143***
(0.020) (0.016)
Female 0.140* 0.091
(0.065) (0.056)
Married 0.373*** 0.347***
(0.072) (0.062)
Native 0.288** 0.397***
(0.104) (0.083)
Union 0.304*** 0.025
(0.078) (0.056)
Religion 0.164 0.124
(0.089) (0.071)
Political Interest 0.743*** 0.794***
(0.049) (0.042)
Contextual Variables
Gini t-1 0.916* 0.500
(0.370) (0.368)
Union Density -0.012 -0.013
(0.010) (0.010)
Income Per Cap t-1 (log) -0.541 -0.860**
(0.319) (0.314)
Population (log) -0.010 0.043
(0.035) (0.038)
Church Attendance -0.157 -0.249
(0.192) (0.198)
Degree -0.007 -0.001
(0.008) (0.009)
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Last Election (months) 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
Incumbent Party -0.323*** -0.221*
(0.088) (0.088)
Regional Party 0.160 -0.016
(0.120) (0.126)
Party Competition -0.020 -0.034*
(0.016) (0.017)
ENP -0.216 -0.192
(0.161) (0.166)
Left-Right Position 5.578* 3.164
(2.170) (2.150)
Gini t-1 # Left-Right Position -0.191** -0.110
(0.072) (0.072)
Constant -22.441 -6.412
(11.554) (11.408)
Variance -3.121 -1.824***
(3.316) (0.328)
Log Likelihood -3194.744 -4638.7965
AIC 6437.488 9325.593
BIC 6605.621 9509.421
Province Year 100 100
N 8,148 15,670
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Figure 5 below offers a comparison of the average marginal effects of inequality by 
the redistributional party system position on turnout, for the bottom two quintiles (left), and 
quintiles 3 to 5 (right). We can see that at the most leftward position on redistribution, the 
effect of inequality on turnout is around zero for the richest three quintiles, whereas for the 
bottom two quintiles, greater inequality increases turnout. Reduced offers of redistribution 
then gradually reduce turnout for all income groups, although to a much larger extent for the 
bottom two quintiles. This suggests that people on low incomes are affected to a greater 
extent by party system redistribution and that leftward positions of redistribution can increase 
turnout for this group under higher inequality, despite the negative effects of inequality on 
turnout.
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Figure 5: Average Marginal Effects of Inequality by Party System Redistribution on Turnout 
for Income Quintiles 1–2 (Left) and 3–5 (Right) with 95% C.I. (Models 3a and 3b)
6. Conclusion
This study provides a novel theoretical case study on the effects of income inequality on 
turnout. It makes use of two uniquely intensive developments in time that occur within a 
specific geography. As the marked increase in income inequality in Canada during the 1990s, 
forms a noteworthy comparison with the precipitous concurrent decline in voter turnout that 
befell the country. The study also seeks to address multiple gaps in the literature. Previous 
research has been focussed cross-nationally or on the US, so a case study of Canada expands 
our knowledge of this key topic beyond the usual regional scope. It also introduces a 
previously unexplored mechanism moderating the relationship between inequality and 
turnout – the policy choice offerings of political parties at the time of elections. 
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Past research has tended to offer support for either relative power or power resource 
theory. This study offers evidence in support of the former, as it finds that income inequality 
does significantly reduce turnout in Canada, with low-income earners negatively impacted 
the most. Past research has also offered little support in favor of conflict theory. However, by 
examining the economic policy space of Canada's party system, we can provide a more direct 
test of conflict theory. The results here indicate that latent conflict (Meltzer and Richard 
1981) only manifests from increasing income inequality – when parties offer greater 
redistribution. As this paper shows that the negative effects of inequality on turnout can be 
mitigated with party system movements to the left on matters of redistribution, which is 
especially pronounced for low-income earners. This finding is particularly relevant to current 
policy debates, since turnout decline in Canada coincided with a strong rightwards policy 
shift on redistribution (Banting 2013: 16; Johnston 2017). Turnout also substantially 
increased in the 2015 election to the highest level since 1993, with inequality a salient issue 
during the campaign, and the Liberal’s moving to the left of the NDP on redistribution for the 
first time since the CMP began coding elections in 1945.
However, further research is required, and the limitations of this study provide 
direction. Prime amongst them is the extent of endogeneity in this situation, as politics affects 
inequality and inequality affects politics. Another limitation involves case confinement. 
There are only 10 provinces in Canada, which provide a far lower number of aggregate-level 
units for measurement than is available cross-nationally or within larger federations such as 
the US. Similarly, this study contains only 10 federal elections, which points to the lack of 
survey availability at the provincial level.
Nevertheless, this paper sheds further light on the detrimental effects of inequality on 
democracy. A primary function of elections is the distribution of power and mounting 
American evidence demonstrates their governments are far more responsive to the wealthy 
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over everyone else (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Gilens 2012; Bowman 2020). It 
would appear from this study that Canada is treading down a similar path to its southern 
neighbour. Although the influence of money is not as prevalent in Canadian democracy as in 
the US, it is still hindered by the narrow boundaries of what is considered acceptable public 
debate and a sometimes “distorted presentation of economic and social realities” (Broadbent 
Institute 2012: 5). Therefore, when there is little chance of electing a representative that will 
champion their interests, individuals are often behaving rationally by refraining from voting 
(Solt 2010). 
This paper also has important policy ramifications. The self-reinforcing nature of 
political and economic inequality means that policymakers need to address both sides of the 
equation. On the political side, an important reform lies with Canada finally redressing the 
inequities inherent in its electoral system with a move towards proportional representation 
(PR). Reforming Canada's majoritarian electoral system was a central plank to the Liberals' 
2015 winning campaign, with Prime Minister Trudeau promising an end to the first-past-the-
post system by the subsequent election, but the pledge was expediently suppressed once in 
power. PR systems provide better representation for low-income earners by facilitating 
alliances between working-class and middle-class voters on redistribution (Iversen and 
Soskice 2006) and turnout is higher in PR systems (Cancela and Geys 2016; Gidengil et al. 
2004: 104).
This study has contributed to a growing body of literature examining the political side 
of inequality. It has yielded important insights into income inequality and turnout in Canada, 
with implications outside the country. As it identifies income inequality as another significant 
culprit in turnout decline and consequently provides further impetus to policymakers to adopt 
reforms and policies that aid in combating income inequality.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Damien Bol and Oliver Heath for very valuable 
advice and comments as well as three anonymous reviewers who helped substantially 
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improve the paper. Versions of this paper have also benefited from the advice and comments 
of André Blais, Joshua Dubrow, Simon Kiss, Benjamin Lobo, Matias López, and Robert 
Speel. Versions of the paper were presented at the 2017 Canadian Political Science 
Association annual conference and the 2019 Canada Research Chair in Electoral Democracy 
weekly seminar at the Université de Montréal.
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